Introduction
The recognition in the United States during World War I of its dependence on German manufactured dyestuffs and advanced pharmaceuticals shocked the public. The dominance of key markets by enemy producers prompted important policy changes. The sequestration of all German-owned U.S. assets by the Alien Property Custodian followed U.S. entry into the war in 1917. German pharmaceutical factories and patents were sold on to U.S. interests with the explicit aim of stimulating domestic production. Prohibitive tariffs on imported chemicals and pharmaceuticals were introduced after the war, stopping any resumption of the import trade in its tracks, and so reducing competitive pressures on the emerging U.S. pharmaceutical sector. 1 The indigenous American pharmaceutical industry was dominated by "patent-medicine" producers, specialist producers of vigorously promoted herbal elixirs and tinctures of doubtful efficacy. The impact on the American pharmaceutical industry of these policy changes was seemingly profound. German-manufactured medicines were no longer competitive in the U.S. market. After a generation of German producers building "patent thickets" in the U.S. market as a competitive barrier, suddenly U.S. pharmaceutical producers could gain access to German intellectual property. 2 There were, however, only a few ethical pharmaceutical manufacturers in the United States that had sufficient manufacturing capabilities to be able to use German technologies. Abbott Laboratories successfully acquired the valuable Bayer patent for synthesizing salicylic acid, the basis for producing aspirin, for example, and subsequently developed a science-focused business in the 1920s and 1930s. 3 Most American producers struggled to adapt. The U.S. pharmaceutical output increased by only just over one-third from 1922 to 1928, nearly half of this in salicylic acid production alone. Given that the dominant suppliers to the U.S. market had been forcibly removed by government decree on entry into the war, this does not seem a particularly fast rate of growth. 4 Just over a decade later, however, by the time of the U.S. entry into World War II, the biggest American pharmaceutical companiesAbbott, Eli Lilly, Merck, Pfizer, and Parke, Davis-had all acquired sufficient technological capabilities that they were able to make major contributions to the war effort, through the crash penicillin program, plasma production, sulfas, and other important therapies. They were therefore well positioned to benefit after the war and enjoyed around half the global market in the early 1950s. 5 While the forced removal of German competition created the opportunity for the indigenous U.S. industry to develop in the 1920s, it was in fact in the 1930s that a dramatic transformation in the technological and manufacturing capabilities of the U.S. pharmaceutical industry occurred. 6 The consensus among historians of the American pharmaceutical industry is that this transition occurred because of a combination of a much greater commitment to internal research among American firms and the growth of increasingly strong collaborative networks between the leading university chemists and private companies. 7 5. Slinn, Abbott, [47] [48] . Also see Church and Tansey, Burroughs Wellcome, 413 . The eight largest U.S. firms had more than half the total market. Abbott, Almanac, 152. Mahoney, Merchants, and Derdak, Directory, give good short overviews of each. Only Hoffmann-La Roche headquartered outside the U.S. could rival the largest five for size at this time, and Hoffmann's success was based on its U.S. subsidiary. The U.S. producers' market share rose from approximately 10 percent of world exports in 1929 to 50 percent by the 1950s. Broadberry, "Performance of Manufacturing," table 3.8, p. 76; Athreye and Godley, "Leapfrogging"; Corley and Godley, "Veterinary Medicines"; Corley and Godley, "Veterinary Medicines in Britain." On the U.S. pharmaceutical sector as an entrepreneurial industry in the 1950s, see generally, Godley, "Entrepreneurial Opportunities"; Godley and Casson, "Doctor, Doctor"; and Godley, "Agribusiness." 6. Steen, American Synthetic Organic Chemicals, conclusion, [287] [288] [289] [290] [291] [292] [293] Shaping, [9] [10] . Liebenau asserts that the scale of industrial R&D increased during the 1920s. Liebenau, Medical Science, 35. But Lee, "Innovation and Strategic Divergence, " and Furman and McGarvie, "Academic Science and the Birth of Industrial Research," 761-762, point to the 1930s as the key period of expansion in pharmaceutical research activities. Others also suggest advances in the 1920s were relatively inconsequential: Kobrak reports that Schering's directors concluded that Parke, Davis had few competitive products or underlying capabilities in 1929, for instance. Kobrak, National Cultures, [169] [170] . Kobrak also suggested that U.S. manufacturing capabilities in the 1920s were insufficient for pharmaceutical producers to take advantage of German patents. Kobrak, "Issues in German Corporate Governance," 16. On the growing links between university scientists and pharmaceutical companies, see Swann, Academic Scientists, who emphasizes that university-and institute-based scientific capabilities were far more advanced than among U.S. company in-house research staff. Also see Lesch, Miracle Drugs, on Johns Hopkins. Lesch also emphasizes the institutional constraints on medical research in the United States compared with Germany (esp. 21-34). George W. Merck's 1922 observations cited earlier on what was unusual about Abbott continued, "What interests me particularly is the splendid cooperation they seem to have gotten from the American Medical Association. This we must not expect to get," George W. Merck to Karl Merck, April 5, 1922 The fragmentary data that exist for individual firms also suggest that research intensity among the leading firms increased during the 1930s.
Abbott spent around $100,000 annually on research in the early to mid-1930s (and had a research staff of twenty-nine by 1933), probably representing a research intensity of around 2½ percent of sales during the mid-1930s. 8 Lilly's expenditure on R&D was claimed to be between 2 and 3 percent of sales in 1930. 9 Merck & Co.'s research intensity grew from only 0.3 percent of sales in 1929 and 0.5 percent in 1930 to 1.4 percent in 1931, 1.5 percent in 1932, 2.0 percent in 1933, 2.3 percent in 1934, 2.4 percent in 1935, 2.8 percent in 1936, 3.2 percent in 1938, 3.3 percent in 1939, and then to 3.9 percent in 1940. 10 There are fewer data for other firms. What data do exist seem to indicate that research intensity was lower elsewhere. 11 hired Alfred Newton Richards from Yale in 1930, Richards was forced to defend his academic reputation, declaring that Merck shared similar values, that "I saw in them no sign of the horns or tail." Sturchio and Galambos, Values and Visions, 23. Furman and MacGarvie, "Academic Science," shows university-industry collaboration did increase, but only after 1938. For the growth of university-industry research collaboration more generally, see Kline, "Constructing "Technology"; Owens, "MIT and the Federal 'Angel'"; and Scheiding, "Building the Scholarly Society Infrastructure." 8. Swann, Academic Scientists, 36; Slinn, Abbott, 11 . See Kogan, Long White Line, 148, for Abbott R&D and sales data. Its annual sales were US$4.0 million in 1931-1933, rising to $7.6 million by 1936, and then further to US$9.5 million in 1937. See Abbott, Almanac, 10, on its research center.
9. Kobrak, National Cultures, 171 . This may have been an exaggeration, as the context was a discussion between Schering and Lilly senior management about relative research strength as a prelude to a possible alliance. In 1934 Lilly had a research and control staff of seventy, or two-and-a-half times that of Abbott's. But Lilly's sales were more than three times bigger than Abbott's, reaching more than US$13 million in 1932. Lilly research staff information from Swann, Academic Scientists, 36; 1932 sales from Indianapolis Star April 18, 1999 post-1932 11. Squibb began the interwar period with a "handful" of researchers, rising to "over fifteen" by 1928 and a research budget of US$200,000 per annum, rising to US$210,000 in 1929. But with total sales at over US$13 million, research expenditure was less than 1.5 percent of sales. Swann, Academic Scientists, 36, 50; Time magazine, August 26, 1929 . Smith, Kline French were enjoying sales of around US$8 million to US$9 million by the mid-1930s, but its research budget was only US$70,000, or less than 1 percent of sales, and it employed only eight research staff. Swann, Academic Scientists, 38. With sales of US$7 million, Upjohn employed 15 research staff in 1932, essentially for control purposes only. Carlisle, Century, 49, 73, 79 . American Home Products expenditure on research only reached 1.1 percent of its sales as late as 1941. "American Home Products Corporation, Historical Data," 1932  4  1  4  0  1933  5  1  2  1  1934  6  3  4  1  1935  3  4  9  3  1936  2  2  3  6  1937  9  10  5  6  1938  5  6  8  11  1939  3  8  9  17  Total  37  35  44  45 Source: Google Patents. Total of all U.S. patents by year of publication from January 1, 1932 , to December 31, 1939 , by selected assignee firms (minus patents for equipment). Firms selected were the four largest U.S. firms (by capital employed in 1950; see Slinn, Abbott, Madison, Lilly, [51] [52] [53] [54] [55] [56] [57] [58] [59] [60] [61] [62] [63] [64] [65] [66] [67] [91] [92] [93] [94] [95] and Mines, Pfizer, [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [51] [52] [53] [54] [55] [56] [57] [58] [59] [60] [61] "German Connection, " :"the firm became one of the leaders in the American industry in the 1930s and 1940s," 14; Steen, American Synthetic Organic Chemicals: Merck was one of the leaders "by 1930," 246. a somewhat different path than its peers in the 1930s, depending on a largely concealed transfer of technology and know-how during the 1930s from its former German parent, E. Merck of Darmstadt. This aspect of Merck & Co.' s history has been omitted from the official corporate histories and largely ignored by academic studies. Transfers of German technology and know-how to American firms were not unknown during the interwar period. Steen describes several such relationships among synthetic dyestuffs producers, for instance. 13 Within the smaller pharmaceutical niche, Bayer had formed the Winthrop Group with Sterling in order to reacquire its U.S. patents and markets in the early1920s, and Schering reestablished its U.S. subsidiary in 1933. 14 This article contends that these were relatively insignificant. Neither of the U.S. operations of Winthrop/Sterling or Schering acquired sufficient prominence in research to be included in the U.S. war effort, for example, in contrast to Merck & Co. 15 The article makes three contributions to the business history literature on the development of the U.S. pharmaceutical industry in the 1930s. First, it offers a substantially more detailed account of the extensive scientific and commercial interrelationships of the two Mercks between 1919 and 1940 than is currently available. Second, the article shows that E. Merck's research and scientific capabilities remained significantly ahead of Merck & Co. until at least 1938 . Third, the case of Merck & Co. shows that where this leading U.S. pharmaceutical producer did gain a clear advantage over its former German parent in the late 1930s was in pharmaceutical manufacturing. Given Merck & Co.' s prominence in the industry in the late 1930s and 1940s, we speculate that this may suggest that advances in understanding process technologies may have been a more significant source of the U.S. industry's remarkable success in producing new medicines during World War II than is currently recognized. 16 The article is organized as follows. The next section describes the two Mercks' relative positions in 1914, the date from which the U.S. subsidiary effectively became an autonomous unit. The impact of the U.S. entry into the war in 1917 on Merck & Co. and its forced separation from Darmstadt is then outlined. Without access to its former parent's products, Merck & Co. struggled 21 Merck & Co.' s 1902 sales were just over US$1.5 million. By 1914 it marketed 3,500 to 4,000 items in the United States, but these represented only one-third of the total number of products E. Merck marketed in Germany. The U.S. subsidiary was relocated to Rahway, New Jersey, where it shortly began to manufacture around 1,000 of the more basic items by 1914, by which point its sales exceeded US$3 million. Merck & Co. had grown to attain some significance since 1891, but it remained "organizationally, technically and financially… tightly linked to the German parent." 22 German success is typically explained by the creation of a specific model for industrial research pursued at a scale hitherto unknown. 23 Large German pharmaceutical firms were typically ten times bigger than their U.S. peers, and thus able to finance far more ambitious and therefore successful research programs. 24 In 1890 E. Merck's key products were processed alkaloids (cocaine, morphine, etc.) 30 From late 1914 the British blockade on raw drug imports prompted German producers to innovate, with new products emerging to replace now unobtainable raw drugs. 31 The absence of raw drugs in Germany also influenced pharmacists' practice, as it "accelerated the pace at which pharmaceutical specialties were replacing raw materials," which therefore gave the leading research-intensive producers more incentive to develop their own brands. 32 E. Merck augmented its position as one of the leading German firms in the interwar period, moving into packaging its medicines in tablet form. Employee numbers increased to 3,600 by 1923 before stabilizing at around 3,000 between 1924 and 1932, then increasing to 4,100 by 1938. 33 27. Research expenditure and sales figures from Burhop, "Pharmaceutical Research," 482-483. In 1902 -1905 , average research expenses were 190,000 marks (of which 80,000 went as payments to university researchers) and average sales were 11.5 million marks. By 1912, E. Merck payments to university researchers increased to 300,000 marks. Assuming the other components of R&D expenditure increased at a similar rate leads to an R&D expenditure of 712,500 marks, and total sales in 1912 of 23 million marks.
28. Burhop, "Pharmaceutical Research," Steen, American Synthetic Organic Chemicals; Huber, and Possehl, 'Was der Mensch, ' 80, 82, 84. 32. Bernschneider-Reif, Huber, and Possehl, 'Was der Mensch,' 86. Cramer shows that branded specialties were the most profitable but low-volume business before 1914. Cramer, "Building the 'World's Pharmacy, '" tables 2, 3, pp. 60, Huber, and Possehl, 'Was der Mensch, ' 73, [86] [87] 97, 94, 101. The company increased its investment in in-house research, establishing a central laboratory in 1927, and was successful in developing new products. 34 This R&D push led to major innovations in plant-protection agents; synthetic vitamins A, C, and D; hormone products; and further developments in sedatives and anesthetics. 35 By 1939 E. Merck, together with other leading producers, had increased Germany's share of world exports in pharmaceuticals from 30 percent (in 1913) to 43 percent. 36 The German parent was therefore very much the dominant partner in the early years of Merck & Co.' s existence. It was a straightforward parent-subsidiary relationship, like many German immigrant businesses in the United States before 1917. The Darmstadt company was much bigger than the Rahway subsidiary (see Table 2 ) and remained so through 1940. Despite its losses from World War I, E. Merck continued as one of the world's leading, research-intensive pharmaceutical producers throughout the interwar period.
Merck & Co.: World War I Sequestration and Conditional Reacquisition
The U.S. government's Alien Property Custodian (APC) sequestrated all German-owned U.S. assets upon the United States entering World War I in 1917, including, in April 1918, E. Merck's 80 percent shareholding in Merck & Co. Despite being a U.S. citizen, George F. Merck was also compelled to turn over two-thirds of his personal 20 percent stake in Merck & Co. to the APC in return for the concession that 34. Schneider, "Das Wissenschafliche Unternehmen." This increase in research intensity was a general feature in Germany. Schering increased its commitment to industrial research during the 1920s, with total R&D expenditure reaching around 3.5 percent of total sales, and perhaps approaching 7 percent of pharmaceutical sales in 1929. Kobrak, National Cultures, [118] [119] [120] [121] mentions in-house R&D expenditure reaching nearly RM 1 million in 1929, with payments in fees to scientists being another RM 400,000 on top (this for 1927). Total 1929 sales were RM 40.2 million. Pharmaceutical sales were 45 percent of this, so assuming that research was overwhelmingly concentrated on pharmaceuticals, the R&D intensity of Schering's pharmaceuticals operations by 1929 was closer to 7 percent of (pharmaceutical) sales. Schering saw E. Merck as its closest rival, Kobrak, National Cultures, 43. The successor to Bayer, IG Farben, had continued with Bayer's industrial research model. In 1927 it spent a remarkable 12.7 percent of total sales on R&D. Sanderson, "Research and the Firm," n. 11. See Burhop, "Max Planck Pre-prints: Pharmaceutical Research," 24, on Merck and Hoechst in-house R&D expansion after World War I; and Bayer, Fifty Years, 12. These are, of course, fragmentary data but are worth comparing with the equally spotty data for interwar U.S. research intensity noted earlier (see notes 9-11).
35. Schneider, "Das Wissenschafliche Unternehmen"; Bernschneider-Reif, Huber, and Possehl, 'Was der Mensch, [94] [95] 101. 36. Kobrak, National Cultures, 44 (1913); Franko, European Multinationals, 36 (1939). he could continue as its president. 37 The APC then sold off as many of these sequestered assets as possible to American companies and American citizens. 38 Despite being a U.S. citizen and long-time resident, given his German background and continued family links to the original German parent, George F. Merck was viewed with suspicion. 39 So when George F. emerged victorious at the auction in May 1919 and reacquired control of the company, there was some considerable official consternation surrounding the German connection. 40 W. H. Moran, chief of the Secret Service, commissioned a report to investigate the sale. The strongest words came from Francis P. Garvan (the APC) writing 37. Merck & Co. was fully incorporated in the state of New York in 1908. Bernschneider-Reif, Huber, and Possehl, 'Was der Mensch,' 73; and Gortler, "Merck in America," 2.
38. Indeed, Garvan even purchased the remaining unsold former German patents and trademarks and donated them to the newly formed Chemical Foundation. Wilkins, History of Foreign Investment, [49] [50] Steen, American Synthetic Organic Chemicals; and Lesch, Miracle Drugs, [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] 39 . to the Advisory Sales Committee of the Office of the Aliens Property Custodian, expressing strong reservations at the outcome of the auction. Garvan's priority was to safeguard "the importance to the American people of the clean, unGermanized manufacture and sale of drugs," but George F. Merck had now reacquired control of Merck & Co., where "the temptation which must exist to those of former German inclination [i.e., George F. Merck] to take advantage of the increased return from a combination with E. Merck" would be overwhelming, because the "financial advantage [to Merck & Co] of a re-alliance with E. Merck of Darmstadt would be tremendous." Furthermore, George F. Merck could not be trusted to keep to any promise to refrain from any connection with Darmstadt, because "his [George F. Merck's] business practices are of the usual secretive German practices." This conundrum meant that the "close connection between Merck & Co and E. Merck of Darmstadt, requires unusual supervision and watchfulness against the renewal of this affiliation after the bars are let down for the resumption of trade between this country and Germany." 41 The result was that as a condition of the sale, George F. Merck was forced to agree to a trust that oversaw his management of Merck & Co. for ten years from July 23, 1919. The trust's purpose was "to insure the continuous Americanization of the business of Merck & Co, both in operation and control … to ensure during the term of the Trust no stock be sold to German citizens, German corporations or corporations mainly controlled by German citizens…. The close connection between Merck & Co and E. Merck of Darmstadt, requires unusual supervision and watchfulness against a renewal of this affiliation." While the trust provided for early termination under limited circumstances, this was conditional on "such termination… not thwart [ing] such purposes." Direction of the firm remained with George F. Merck. Crucially, the trustees were empowered "to ensure the continuous Americanization of the business." 42 Merck & Co. had fully complied with the terms of the trust. While there had been some necessary interchange between the German and American Mercks in the 1920s to resolve the rights to the Merck name, Perkins was vehement, emphasizing that there had never been any mutual "ownership interest,… influence or control, directly or indirectly" between the two companies since 1919. 47 In a later 2011 publication, Galambos and Sturchio reviewed the relationship between the two Mercks and offered an important nuance to their original view, that the APC-mandated separation was the sole critical event. In this later article the authors outlined how 45. Galambos and Sturchio, "Transnational Investment, " 241. 46 . Galambos and Sturchio, 'Transnational Investment', pp. 241-2. Note 54, p. 242, refers to correspondence dated 1921 as the source. Note 56 states that the 'conclusion to this phase of the relationship… actually falls outside of our time period for this essay', which may explain why the dramatic rekindling of the relationship in the 1930s was missed.
47. Perkins to Blauvelt, March 1942, RG 131 RAP. Note that Perkins mistook the length of the period the trust was to operate, suggesting it was only five and not ten years. Our thanks to Mira Wilkins for alerting us to this source, which she cites in History of Foreign Investment, 819n315. Perkins was a key figure in the development of Merck, whose contribution has not been fully recognized. See Leon Gortler, "Interview with Adolphe Rosengarten," MA.
George F. Merck, despite now being in control of the independent American Merck, actually would have preferred to have reverted to the prewar business model.
German blood was thicker than the strict rules of corporate governance… the flow of ideas from Darmstadt continued on an informal basis until George [F] Merck's death in 1926.
It was only when George F.'s son, George W. Merck, became president in 1925 that, the company appears to have adopted a new business strategy. The links to Germany and E. Merck appear at last to have been broken, and a thoroughly American corporation emerged. Through acquisition and through a new approach to research and development, the new president of the business internalized functions that had for forty years been provided by E. Merck. 48 In this later piece the authors suggest that the change in leadership of 1925 led to the decisive break with Darmstadt, as opposed to the formal transfer of ownership of 1919. They go on to state that George W.'s strategy was to replicate the Darmstadt business model in the United States. 49 But the basic business strategy of getting close to advanced medical science, developing internal capabilities as well as elaborate external networks, and stressing the purity of their products and the scientific nature of the processes were all familiar, well-tested E. Merck strategies. 50 This need to internalize the previously Darmstadt-based research function, then, explains the investment in new research laboratories in the early 1930s, and notably the Merck Institute of Therapeutic Research. 51 The authors emphasize that the ability of George W. 
Breaking the Trust
Constrained by the terms of the trust, George F. Merck was faced with a stark choice after World War I. He could have continued to specialize in fine chemicals production, but after the wartime boom, conditions in fine chemicals were increasingly difficult. He could have copied other ethical pharmaceutical companies, such as Squibb, Sterling, Sharp and Dohme, and others, that were diversifying into consumer goods. Or he could have ignored the terms of the trust and resurrected the prewar business model. It was this last option that he chose.
On September 12, 1919, less than two months after the formal agreement of the trust, and in complete contradiction of its terms, George F. Merck cabled E. Merck, saying, "We are now authorized to trade with you and will be glad to receive quotations. Our George W Merck will call on you next month." 55 [the] physical obstacle of the Atlantic is but a small matter when the basis of our understanding is so firmly established. You need never concern yourself that any small untoward incident will influence the true course of our relations." 56 However, wartime restrictions on trade were only slowly repealed. Then, in 1921 and 1922, tariffs on most pharmaceutical imports were doubled or more. This posed a significant threat to any resumption of the two Merck companies' prewar business relationship. After having been dominated by German imports up to 1914, the U.S. pharmaceutical market suddenly became supplied almost entirely by domestically produced output. Imports represented only 1.8 percent of U.S. consumption of pharmaceutical products in the late 1920s. 57 It was only with the final settlement of the peace treaties in August 1921 that there was a legal structure in place in the United States to address the outstanding legal claims from German citizens. 58 In late 1921 Karl Merck visited Rahway to discuss Darmstadt's loss of its former U.S. subsidiary. There were two issues that needed to be resolved. First, to review the terms and conditions of the compensation E. Merck was to receive from the U.S. government arising from the sequestration and then sale of the German-owned assets of Merck & Co. Second, to clarify the rights to the name "Merck" that the newly independent Merck & Co. might own in the U.S. and other markets.
The financial settlement was complicated by the opacity of crossownership ties between the Darmstadt and Rahway branches of the Merck family. While all agreed that Darmstadt owned 80 percent of the U.S. subsidiary and George F. Merck the balance of 20 percent, George F. Merck had also claimed to the APC that he had lost his 19 percent share of ownership in the Darmstadt parent without compensation. The U.S. authorities accepted his valuation of this stake as US$1,020,108, and so reimbursed him from the proceeds of the US$3.75 million raised from the sale of Darmstadt's 80 percent stake 56. George W. Merck to Karl Merck, December 24, 1920, EMA, folder E10. 57. Kobrak, National Cultures, 143-144, 150-151, 159, and table 13, p. 369. 58. Kobrak, National Cultures, 159-160. of Merck & Co. 59 It was this sum that Karl Merck wanted to review during late 1921. The cousins arrived at some satisfactory but unwritten solution, wherein George F. Merck voluntarily returned to Darmstadt US$400,000 in recognition that he had been overpaid for his interest in E. Merck. From this point on, "extremely cordial" relations between the two Merck's resumed, albeit always on the basis of "informal cooperation." 60 Indeed, given the closeness of the ties between the two Mercks from 1921, the number of formal agreements was remarkably small. "Research information was exchanged, the executives of the two companies often visited each other, business information was given to each other," Merck & Co. resumed its prewar role as the U.S. distributor for E. Merck, and a market share agreement, determining which company was allowed to sell in which market, was strictly observed; but all this was based on verbal agreements. The only written agreements were a handful of licensing agreements. 61 Once the financial consequences of the sequestration had been resolved, the correspondence between the two companies reflected the fluctuations in the new business relationship. During the early 1920s, as Galambos and Sturchio state, the two companies had cordial but increasingly distant relations. What will become clear, however, is that this fundamentally changed from the end of the 1920s onward. 
Dwindling Affections: The 1920s
The first contact after the financial resolution of the two companies' severance came when George W. Merck wrote to Karl Merck on January 30, 1922. George W. reported that progress was being made in selling Darmstadt's specialties, albeit deliberately gradual, so as to avoid the "danger of raising a cry of 'German specialties deluging the market,'" but marketing efforts were nevertheless being increased. While this was a welcome outcome from Karl's visit of late 1921, it was the "interchange of information [on manufacturing processes that was] most profitable" to Rahway. 62 George W. hoped that some of Rahway's processes might be of reciprocal interest to Darmstadt, but Karl replied that none of the manufacturing processes Rahway had suggested Darmstadt might want to adopt were worthwhile. 63 The increases in tariff barriers in 1921 and 1922 made importing increasingly cost-ineffective. George W. wrote again in early April asking whether the former Rahway factory manager might come and spend some days at Darmstadt, and, through detailed conversations with Fritz Merck, learn how to apply the superior Darmstadt processes in Rahway. 64 George W. was trying to persuade Darmstadt to let Rahway manufacture more of its specialties rather than simply distribute increasingly costly imported goods.
The Rahway factory manager was welcomed with open arms by Darmstadt and given as much information as he needed about how to change Rahway's processes and make them more profitable. 65 George W. pursued this theme in July 1922, emphasizing that tariffs now made it prohibitively expensive to import even the newest specialty (called "Eukodal"), so could Darmstadt please provide the necessary information and materials to support its manufacture at Rahway. He reinforced this with a request for permission to manufacture another product, Skiabaryt, in December 1922. 66 Karl's reply did not directly address this request and instead proposed a visit was needed for further discussion, but that visit did not take place. 67 surge in enthusiasm for the rekindling of commercial relations between the two Mercks, Darmstadt began to lose interest. Two years later in November 1924, George W. Merck insisted to Louis Merck that it "would be of inordinate value to the business to have you with us again for a while… it has been a long time since someone from Darmstadt has been here," and that Merck & Co. was eager to "develop the business with your products in our territory," especially with specialties. Louis's reply to George W. exposed the fragility of the unwritten "agreement" between the cousins. For while Darmstadt was happy for a few of its products to be manufactured in Rahway, this was predicated on Merck & Co. being an effective distributor for Darmstadtmanufactured goods in the United States, but the U.S. sales of Darmstadt's products since the end of the war had proven to be very disappointing. Total sales of all E. Merck goods in the United States during 1922 to 1924 were only one-third their (nominal) 1913 value. The sales performance of Darmstadt manufactured specialties was even worse. This criticism must have stung. It exposed Merck & Co.'s dependence on E. Merck's products. George W.'s response was to insist that the adverse impact of increased tariff barriers as well as the wartime loss of patent protection-"through no fault of ours"-meant that the true "picture is a different one." Darmstadt was not interested. 68 Plans for Louis's visit to New York were cancelled. Silence reigned. In the summer of 1925 George was reduced to rather petulantly complaining about possible sales territory incursions. 69 In October 1925 George W. tried again, now in his position as president of Merck & Co., after George F.'s retirement. He implored someone to visit. "Except for Karl's visit [in 1921] , which really had to do with financial matters, we have had no one from your House since before the War. But sooner or later, and probably later, there will be a revision of the tariff downward," he added. If there was little prospect of any meaningful return to Rahway's role as Darmstadt's distributor, then surely Darmstadt could show Rahway how to manufacture its specialties, "which at present I see as our greatest hope. I think we could learn a great deal from you. Rudi Gruber is trying to arrange to get abroad early next year to spend some weeks with you, particularly your Specialties Department. 73 The merger enabled Merck to immediately acquire some increased significance in the fine chemicals market. Sales rose to US$13.1 million in 1928, but then fell again to US$9.21 million in 1932, and remained stagnant during the worst of the Depression. Costs were cut and manufacturing capacity was rationalized onto the Rahway site. 74 The merger meant that the newly reconstituted Merck & Co. Inc. was the largest fine chemical manufacturer in the United States. As noted earlier, it has been interpreted by Merck 72. Galambos and Sturchio, "Transnational Investment," 241-242. 73. Galambos and Sturchio, "Transnational Investment," 241-242; Gortler, "Merck in America," 2-3; "Rosengarten interview," 2. The Rosengarten family wanted to sell up and were looking for possible partners. They had explored a potential acquisition by Pfizer, but this apparently fell foul of antitrust concerns. Because Merck & Co. was both so much smaller and were struggling, the newly merged company posed no antitrust threats and the merger proceeded speedily. The Rosengartens even lent George F. Merck up to US$6 million to complete the takeover.
74. Rosengarten interview, 6-7; Gortler, "Merck in America," 2-3. a statement of George W. Merck's pursuit of an independent business strategy. 75 One consequence of the merger with PWR was that the trust was formally ended. Of course, from the outset the two George Mercks had set about to thwart Garvan's intention to ensure a permanent severance of ties between Darmstadt and Rahway with the trust. Ironically, however, Darmstadt's calculation of its interests in the United States was leading ineluctably to Garvan's goal because of Darmstadt's commitment to a home-base manufacture and export model and Rahway's inability to promote German imported products to the U.S. market sufficiently well to overcome the prices imposed by the tariff barriers. The merger was the clearest statement by George W. Merck that the strategy of re-creating the prewar relationship had failed, not because of the trust, but because of Darmstadt's unwillingness to deviate from its strategy of centralized manufacturing and its unwillingness to support Rahway's desire to increase the range of products (in particular pharmaceutical specialties) it was also able to manufacture. Without access to Darmstadt's technologies and know-how, Merck & Co. might try and re-create the Darmstadt model at Rahway through its own efforts, but that was an extremely difficult business strategy to pull off. In what can only be seen as a remarkable change of fortunes, the merger precipitated a change of heart at Darmstadt toward Rahway.
The "Treaty Agreement," November 17, 1932, and the "Protocol," November 1934 Darmstadt insisted on its conditions being met, however.
Of course I have kept daily before me the matters we discussed together in Darmstadt, and in particular various points of contact which must be satisfactorily conducted in order that a relationship of real mutual benefit may be brought about. 77 George W. went on to detail responses to the long-standing Darmstadt concerns that Merck & Co. was not promoting its German manufactured chemicals and specialties sufficiently, and he reassured Karl that the newly merged Merck and PWR would not encroach on E. Merck's overseas markets. 78 George W. emphasized again the impact of tariffs on German imported goods, and while he reiterated that there might be U.S. demand for German-made specialties, he returned to what had been a recurrent, but rebuffed, theme since 1922.
Generally speaking, the best opportunities for developing manufacture over here are not in staple products, but in specialtieseither in patented medicinal specialties or special articles for certain industries. 79 After years of Darmstadt showing little interest in changing its business to accommodate Rahway, the PWR merger had prompted a visit, which now changed Darmstadt's response. Correspondence grew as business relations intensified through 1929 and 1930. 80 In had resisted any substantial development of this model. Its strong preference was for centralizing production of pharmaceuticals at Darmstadt and then exporting around the world. This was perfectly understandable, given how important quality control was to pharmaceutical production. 82 Allowing Rahway to manufacture under license introduced the risk of lower manufacturing standards, but the seeming permanence of imports being shut out of the U.S. market meant that the bullet of local manufacturing had to be bitten. Certainly both parties had a strong incentive to reinvigorate the relationship, but Darmstadt wanted it formalized. After another extended visit to Rahway, Karl Merck gave Louis Merck an update in November 1931 on the discussions that led to what became known as the "Treaty Agreement." The German objective was threefold: to get a formal agreement about which company could export to which overseas markets; to have a clear idea about and accounting for the profit sharing on the Darmstadt manufacturing processes that Rahway was always so eager to adopt; and to limit Rahway's access to Darmstadt technology. 83 It took a further year before the treaty was signed. George W. Merck could only offer a "practical working understanding" with respect to the proposed restrictions on export markets, something that was later seized on by U.S. antitrust investigators. 84 Karl and Louis, by contrast, insisted that there should be no provision for sharing scientific research. 85 Disappointed by this, George W. had grasped at the straw that it was the informal exchange of ideas on manufacturing processes that was always for Rahway "the thing of greatest value." 86 George W. Merck's ambitions had undoubtedly grown since the merger with PWR. He had recruited Randolph Major, a chemist from Princeton, to improve research into manufacturing processes. 87 Major had encouraged George W. Merck to explore the possibility of vitamin production. 88 The scientific discovery of vitamins and their isolation was one of the most significant developments in pharmaceuticals in 82. Schneider, "Das Wissenschaftliche Unternehmen," emphasizes the importance of centralization to the Darmstadt business model in the 1920s. Liebenau, "Modernizing the Business of Health," outlines how quality control concerns meant centralization of production was the typical strategy for all the larger pharmaceutical companies in the interwar period.
83 91 The treaty was eventually signed in November 1932, "I am pleased that we have all agreed with our difficulties so that we shall soon sign the Agreement," wrote Louis Merck to George W. in November 1932. 92 The "Treaty Agreement of November 17, 1932," summarized firstly the mutual rights to the Merck name in different overseas markets (articles 1 and 2), and documented the pooling of technological knowledge between the two companies and the arrangement for profit sharing (articles 5 and 6). There were other significant agreements between U.S. and overseas firms on technology sharing in the interwar period, but this was one of the most comprehensive. The appendix initially contained a list of 250 products that were covered by the treaty, rising to 432 products by 1939. 93 treaty undoubtedly restricted Merck & Co.'s exporting opportunities, locking both parties into their respective "spheres of influence," it gave Rahway an unprecedented opportunity to benchmark its manufacturing processes. 94 Almost immediately after the signing, the Rahway staff methodically went through the list of processes, identifying those for which they wanted a detailed comparison with Darmstadt. One of Rahway's senior factory managers, R. P. Lukens, was dispatched to Darmstadt shortly after, visiting in May 1933. The initial benchmarking exercise undertaken by Lukens and his Darmstadt equivalent, Dr. Kulenkamff, identified forty-six of the 250 preparations for which there were significant variations in cost or yield or method in the two factories. For these forty-six processes, the methods were exchanged and tested at both sites during June and July 1933. 95 The detailed comparison of manufacturing processes for these forty-six chemical preparations suggested that, on balance, in 1933 Darmstadt methods produced a superior yield, but Rahway's methods were relatively more efficient in their use of labor. 96 Lukens had also broached the topic of sharing early-stage research findings during his stay. The treaty of just a few months before had prohibited this, but Lukens reported that the response of the leading scientists at Darmstadt, Dr. Fritz Merck, Dr. Otto Dalmer (Head of Research), and Kulenkamff, was far more positive than Karl and Louis Merck's earlier response and that the Darmstadt scientists were "willing to co-operate" in sharing research ideas. 97 George W. Merck quickly followed this up with Karl Merck, suggesting that the two companies would "place the results of their research mutually at the disposal of the contracting parties [both Mercks] on a broad scope. Nothing definite was laid down about the treatment of patents and trademarks pertaining to the products resulting from such research." 98 By March 1934 discussions had moved on to agree that "patent data, i.e. scientific and technical features, are to be reported promptly to the contracting parties in connection with the regular exchange of research information." 99 A draft agreement on patents and trademarks was also drawn up in 1934. While this was never formally executed, the exchange of intellectual property between the two Merck companies began in earnest. 94 . The "spheres of influence" comment is from OMGGUS, "Report," 45. 95. Lukens to George W. Merck, June 7, 1933 Molitor's initial research program between 1934 and 1936 was focused on anesthetics, alkaloids, hypnotics, antispasmodics, vagomimetic and sympathomimetic drugs, and vitamins (as food supplements), notably vitamin C. Later, from 1936, vitamin B1 became increasingly important, so that by 1939 vitamin research overall accounted for half of all Merck Institute time. 103 This initial research program at the institute did not emerge from a vacuum, but it also did not emerge from any preexisting commitment to any particular Table 1 for Merck & Co. patents for 1937 -1939 101. Lesch covers the Institute in, Miracle Drugs, [198] [199] . For the institute to gain a license for animal experimentation under New Jersey antivivisection law, the state required it to be legally separate from the company. This has led some to assume that this was the driver for the institute's creation. However, Rosengarten emphasizes that this was an afterthought; see Rosengarten interview, 9-10. Hans Molitor came from Vienna because there was no American university scientist of sufficient standing willing to leave academia; see Rosengarten interview, 8. The opening of the Merck Institute was followed by Lilly's Research Laboratories (opened 1934), then Abbott and Squibb opened their own research centers in 1938. Abbott invested US$500,000 in its 1938 research center. Abbott Laboratories, Abbott Almanac, 10. Swann views these as particularly significant moments in the development of the U.S. industry. Swann, Academic Scientists, 41-47. However, as with any image-building exercise, it was easy for the currency to become debased. In 1937 Warner opened up is own research institute to great fanfare, and Warner never had any research pretensions. Deeson, Parke, Davis, 42. 102. Tishler interview, 4-5. Lesch, Miracle Drugs, 6, describes Tishler as "among the most articulate of commentators" on the development of pharmaceutical research in the U.S. from the 1930s to the 1960s.
103. Lesch, Miracle Drugs, [198] [199] Swann, Academic Scientists, [46] [47] [48] research pathway within the firm. This "Protocol" document bears close reading. It was the documentary outcome of the process begun by Lukens in the summer of 1933 in broaching the topic of sharing research, a feature that had been deliberately omitted from the 1932 treaty at Darmstadt's insistence. If the technological competences of both contracting parties were approximately the same, then both stood to gain more or less equally from the research protocol. However, Darmstadt was acutely aware that while Merck & Co. and E. Merck enjoyed approximate parity in chemicals manufacturing expertise by the early 1930s, Darmstadt's expertise in research and specialties was far ahead of Rahway's. This is apparent from the list of "researches and new products" covered in the protocol. Out of thirty-five listed, only six were listed as Rahway developments, one of which, vitamin B1, was included but, having only just been offered to Rahway by an external inventor, was too early to make judgments about. Of the twenty-nine preparations emerging from Darmstadt, the products and technologies were focused on anesthetics, improved alkaloids, hypnotics, antispasmodics, vagomimetic and sympathomimetic drugs, and of course vitamins, notably vitamin C research, exactly the same areas as those prioritized by Molitor in the Merck Institute's initial research program. 110 Molitor had spent considerable time at Darmstadt on his appointment to the Merck Institute. Within weeks of Molitor's arrival at Rahway, George W. Merck was sending him back to Europe for an extended visit to Darmstadt. George W. wrote to Karl Merck at the end of October, "I was very glad that you counted the visit of Dr Molitor as beneficial to you; we certainly feel that it was on this side … to further the co-operation between our Companies." 111 Given the range of potential subject areas Molitor, Major, and Merck might have chosen to prioritize in 1933, the overlap between exactly those areas 109. Copies in the U.S. National Archives, MA, and EMA. 110. The research protocol lists the following Darmstadt developments, improved ether (anesthetic), quinine, and procaine (alkaloids and antispasmodics), spasmolytics (anti-spasmodic), ergotin, (vagomimetic) digitoxin and ephedrine (sympathomimetic alkaloids), and vitamin C. Merck & Co.'s products included papaverin, colloidal iodine solution, sodium perborate, acetyl salicylic acid, all fine chemicals, with vinethine and vitamin B1 as their two specialties, both of which originated from outside inventors. The evidence of Rahway's improvement in manufacturing capabilities can be traced through specific product discussion between the two sites, and then successive benchmarking exercises. First, a February 1935 invitation to discuss Merck & Co.' s lactic acid processes led to an invitation for Darmstadt to "explore the manufacture of Citric Acid by fermentation process from the point of view of any interest it may hold for E. Merck." Recall that Darmstadt was one of the world leaders in vitamin C production. After benchmarking, Rahway's production processes were deemed to be superior, and this led in November 1936 to a separate agreement for ascorbic acid (bulk sales). 114 During September 1937 there was a further revision to the range of products included in the treaty. Out of the original 250 products, 112. The institute conducted experimental research for university researchers, for example. Swann, Academic Scientists, [47] [48] 113 116 By 1938 Rahway's increasing capabilities for manufacturing even the newer specialties had become clear. In the subsequent revision to the treaty, dated June 10, 1938, the new additions included three very significant new specialties: "Ascorbic Acid (Vitamin C) and Tablets," "Sulfanilamide (p-aminobenzene-Sulfonamide)," and "Vitamin B1 (crystal, synthetic, natural and tablet)." 117 The inclusion of vitamin B1 in the summer of 1938 is particularly significant, because vitamin B1 was Merck & Co.' s own breakthrough product. Its arrival at Rahway, which the November 1934 research protocol had alluded to, was nothing to do with the Merck & Co. research program. Molitor's vitamin research in 1933 and 1934, as already noted, was focused on Darmstadt's vitamin C processes. Instead, Robert Williams, an independent researcher employed by Bell Labs but with links to Columbia University, wanted to test his idea that the vitamin occurred naturally in rice husks. For this he required industrial-scale rice-polishing and testing facilities; hence his approach to Merck & Co. Early results were sufficiently promising to lead to its inclusion as one of Rahway's few specialties in the research protocol list. It took another two years before the critical breakthrough of synthesizing vitamin B1 was accomplished, but this was done by Merck & Co.' s researchers, notably J. K. Cline. Then "the door was 115. "Verfahrenes…" October 24, 1937, MA. 116. Lukens to E. Merck, Darmstadt, 6 th December, 1937 , MA. 117. "Treaty Agreement," revised, June 10, 1938 opened for its economical and large scale production." 118 With some further months of development research required to establish a pilot and then a manufacturing plant, Merck launched vitamin B1 into the U.S. market at the end of 1937, and by 1940 it was generating significant revenues. In December 1941 the company highlighted the significance of vitamin B1 sales in its prospectus to potential investors for a new stock offering. 119 At this point Merck & Co. was happy to advertise that since 1936 its research had led to a host of new products, ranging from vitamins B2, B6, C, E, G, and K to sulfonamides, but pride of place went to the increase in sales from vitamin B1.
Vitamin B1 also changed the nature of the relationship with Darmstadt. As was emphasized earlier, from the resumption of commercial relations in late 1921 through to the late 1930s, Rahway was unambiguously the junior partner. It had largely depended on Darmstadt technology, and it was only from 1928 at the very earliest that Darmstadt saw it was in its interests to allow Rahway increasing access to, first, manufacturing processes, and then, from 1934, its research and new specialties. Molitor seemingly focused the Merck Institute research program exactly on those areas of new research that Darmstadt was willing to include in the November 1934 research protocol. The exchange of information on manufacturing processes contributed to improvements in manufacturing productivity on both sides, but notably led to Merck & Co.'s improvement in yield seen by the end of 1937. Merck & Co.'s manufacturing capabilities in chemical production were now, according to the benchmark data, consistently equal to and in many areas ahead of Darmstadt. Its research capabilities were also rapidly catching up.
The synthesis of vitamin B1 in 1936 and 1937 was the critical breakthrough that demonstrated to Darmstadt that Rahway had acquired some considerable scientific competence. While it did not initially lead to much interest from Darmstadt, the obvious commercial significance was such that Darmstadt went to some considerable lengths to acquire the European manufacturing rights. 120 The agreement was 118. Merck Review, November 1958, 5-6. 119 . APC Division of Investigative Research, "Merck & Co." 19: the vitamin business became significant for the business "after 1939." "Prospectus, December 9 th 1941," RG 131 RAP.
120. There is an enormous volume of correspondence on this at Darmstadt, see EMA S4/87b and S4/87c. The first mention in the correspondence is in May 1935, when Louis Merck writes to Gruber that he had forwarded Rahway's information to Darmstadt's scientists, which had prompted a lot of questions-partly because they were aware that IG Farben had lodged a potentially competing patent. Louis Merck to Gruber, May 9, 1935, B/18b; Louis Merck to Gruber, July 28, 1936 The provisions in the treaty on the mutual exchange of information were "nothing more than the reduction to writing of common practice … simply a means by which each party endeavored to get the benefit of the other's manufacturing experience … nothing unusual in the arrangement to procure new production" from Darmstadt. 123 The letter was carefully written, for while almost everything in it was credible, it deliberately downplayed the significance of the relationship with Darmstadt. It is noteworthy that none of the investigating agents of the APC or antitrust investigation or the Office of Military Government for Germany believed this version of events. All were convinced that the relationship between the two Mercks was an unofficial and informal partnership, the extent of which had been deliberately obscured from the authorities to protect the private interests of the companies. 124 
Conclusion
George F. Merck reacquired control of Merck & Co. in 1919 . The terms of the APC-mandated trust were to ensure that Merck & Co. would be permanently severed from its former parent, E. Merck. The current literature suggests that Merck & Co. very largely complied with the terms of the trust, that exchanges between the two Mercks, once the outstanding wartime financial issues were resolved, were limited to personal correspondence, some technical assistance, and the correspondence to support the sale of a few Darmstadt manufactured products in the United States. Previous studies have suggested that Merck & Co. was entirely independent of any influence from its former German parent by sometime in mid-1920s. 125 "While some transfers of knowledge were probably re-created in the 1920s, the aftermath of the war was an increasingly independent American firm, Merck & Co. Inc." 126 George F. Merck may have wanted to return to the prewar business model. but the current view of Merck & Co.' s interwar evolution is that George W. Merck, on assuming the presidency, was set on a course of autonomy and independence. George W. Merck is remembered as a business leader unusual for being so farsighted, so focused on science and research, and not on profits. He is generally seen as being central to Merck & Co.'s acquisition of independent research capabilities before 1940. 127 This interpretation underestimates Merck & Co.' s continuing dependence on the larger E. Merck for access to the most advanced products in the interwar period. From the moment George F. Merck reacquired control of Merck & Co., considerable efforts were made to re-engage with the company's former parent and reestablish the prewar business relationship, regardless of the existence of the trust. Nevertheless, the attempts to reestablish the prewar business relationship were dashed between the Scylla of high U.S. tariffs and the Charybdis of Darmstadt's commitment to retaining central control of almost all manufacturing. As the two companies drifted apart, Merck & Co.' s fortunes stagnated, forcing a merger with the larger Powers Weightman Rosengarten in 1927. This merger, almost paradoxically after years of stalemate, proved to be the catalyst that re-created the relationship between the two Mercks, leading first to several visits and exchanges of information, then to the 1932 treaty and the 1934 protocol, and ultimately to the very significant transfer of technology from E. Merck to Merck & Co.
The 1932 treaty and its subsequent 1934 extension to include research and specialties (the research protocol) were therefore key events in the formation of Merck & Co.' s independent research and advanced manufacturing capabilities. The treaty precipitated Lukens's successive benchmarking exercise from 1933 onward, which, as the later benchmarking exercises confirm, show that Rahway's manufacturing capabilities were catching up with, and in several areas actually exceeded, those at Darmstadt by 1938. It is against the context of the treaty and the research protocol that the recruitment of Major and Molitor, the establishment of the Merck Institute of Therapeutic Research and the Central Research Laboratories, and the bridges built with university scientists in the United States should be judged. From the time of the November 1934 research protocol onward, Merck & Co.'s scientists gained privileged access to superior process and product technologies, enabling Rahway's scientists to acquire insight and understanding of advanced research knowledge, routines, and know-how without having to do all the experimental work themselves.
The German influence at Merck & Co. was therefore more profound and much longer lasting than has hitherto been thought. While Merck & Co. was expanding its internal research capabilities from 1933 onward, the evidence on research expenditure, publications, and patents presented here suggests that Merck & Co.' s Rahway-based scientists were indeed beginning to move from focusing on developmental research to more fundamental pharmaceutical research in the 1930s, but only in the late 1930s, perhaps as late as 1937 and 1938. Judging from the patent data, where even as late as 1937 to 1939 more than half of all Merck & Co.' s U.S. patents were actually Darmstadt inventions, Merck & Co.' s scientific and research capabilities still lagged behind those of E. Merck.
By contrast, the case of Merck & Co. suggests that where U.S. pharmaceutical producers may have caught up with and even overtaken German producers was in process technologies. Merck & Co. was generating additional yield with greater labor efficiencies than E. Merck across most benchmarked processes by 1937 and 1938. Merck & Co. was one of the leading pharmaceutical companies in the U.S. war effort and went on to become one of the globally dominant producers after 1945. The current view in the business history literature is that it acquired sufficiently sophisticated research and manufacturing capabilities by 1940 entirely through the decisions made by its senior management, notably George W. Merck, in creating its own internal research capacity. This view is not wrong. It is just incomplete. It is a view that is based on a detailed reconstruction of the company's relationship with its former parent in the 1920s, and the research presented here confirms that this relationship grew increasingly distant. However, scholars have previously omitted continuing this research for the 1930s. Here, by contrast, and benefiting from access to previously unpublished sources from the extensive Darmstadt archive, we have been able to present a substantially more detailed account of the two companies' interwar relationship, and in particular to show how the merger with PWR led directly to a dramatic change and to much closer cooperation. This growing closeness was embodied in the 1932 treaty and the 1934 research protocol (and its subsequent revisions). When these documents are analyzed in detail, it is clear that Rahway's research capabilities were far behind those of Darmstadt in the early 1930s. The imbalance of the 1934 protocol demonstrates that. By 1938, however, after George W. Merck's substantial increase in research expenditures and the establishment and growth of Molitor's Merck Institute, and also after the sharing of knowledge between Rahway and Darmstadt, Rahway's research capabilities had improved significantly, and it could justifiably be considered among the leaders in the U.S. industry. The successful synthesis of vitamin B 1 and then its commercially successful launch was undoubtedly a breakthrough episode for Rahway.
The case of Merck & Co. therefore needs to be understood in the light of it being the beneficiary of this substantial and previously ignored technology transfer from its former German parent. George W. Merck was indeed making every effort to replicate the Darmstadt model at Rahway, as scholars have previously noted. 128 However, his success in achieving these objectives was seemingly dependent on the transfer of technology and process know-how from Darmstadt. Because of Merck's position of leadership within the U.S. industry, this is a significant caveat to this important case. The conventional understanding is that the U.S. government's intervention during and after World War I allowed American firms to "accumulate a pool of technical expertise through education and experience." 129 The caveat would be that for one of the most important American pharmaceutical firms, Merck & Co., this accumulation of technical expertise was enormously augmented by support from its former German parent, E. Merck of Darmstadt.
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